Here we offer the translation of Augustine’s ‘De Mendacio.’ We have made this rendering as literal and full as possible, in order to preserve the style and depth of Augustine’s reasoning.

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ON LYING

The Difficulty of the Subject to Be Treated

The question of the lie is a great matter, and one that often throws us into perplexity in our daily conduct. We do not wish, on the one hand, to call something a lie which is not a lie; nor, on the other, do we wish to suppose that it is sometimes necessary to lie — for example, with an honorable, dutiful, or merciful lie.

We shall examine this question with care, seeking together with those who seek. Whether we shall find anything, without rushing to hasty conclusions, the attentive reader will himself observe. The subject is, in fact, a very dark one, and often slips from the seeker’s attention by its winding, almost cavernous paths. Sometimes what seemed to have been found seems to slip from the hands again, only to surface once more, and then once again to vanish. In the end, however, a more careful inquiry will lead us to a clear opinion.

If, in that opinion, there is some error, let it be remembered that truth delivers us from every error, while untruth entangles us in every error. I believe that one never strays more safely than when one strays out of too great a love for the truth and too great a horror of untruth. He who judges severely will call this “too much.” But perhaps Truth herself will say: “It is not yet enough.” To whoever reads this I make my plea: do not pass judgment until you have read the whole; then you will have less to censure. Do not look for lofty language, for we have labored hard upon the substance, and wished to bring this work, so necessary for daily life, swiftly to completion. For that reason we have given little or no attention to the choice of words.

Jokes Are Not Lies

With the exception of jokes, which have never been considered lies. By the tone and the manner of the jester it is plainly evident that his intention is not to deceive, even though what he says is not factually true. Whether it is fitting for perfect souls to make jokes is another question, which we shall not treat here. Setting jokes aside, then, we must first take care that one who does not lie should not be reckoned a liar.

What Is a Lie?

We must, therefore, examine what a lie is. Not everyone who says something untrue lies, if he believes or supposes that what he says is true. The difference between believing and supposing is this: he who believes sometimes recognizes that he does not know what he believes, although, if he is firmly convinced of it, he in no way doubts it. He who supposes, however, thinks that he knows what in fact he does not know.

Whoever utters that which he believes or supposes in his mind does not lie, even if it is untrue. He owes it to the sincerity of his utterance to bring out into the open that which he has within his mind, and he has it within his mind just as he utters it. Yet he is not without fault, even though he does not lie, if he believes things that ought not to be believed, or thinks that he knows what he does not know, even if it should turn out to be true. He treats, in that case, the unknown as known.

Hence the man who has one thing in his mind and utters another in words or by any other signs whatsoever — he lies. From this comes the saying about the “double heart” of the liar: that is, a double thought — the one thought, concerning the matter which he knows or supposes to be true and which he does not utter; the other, concerning the matter which he utters in its place, knowing or supposing this latter to be untrue.

From this it follows that someone may say something untrue without lying, if he thinks the matter to be as he says it, even though it is not. And it follows also that someone may speak the truth while lying, if he thinks the matter to be untrue and presents it as true, even though in reality the matter stands as he has said. For a liar, or a non-liar, must be judged according to the conviction of his own mind, not according to the truth or falsehood of the facts themselves.

The guilt of the liar is the wish to deceive by what he says — whether he succeeds in his deception when he is believed, or fails, whether because he is not believed, or because, with the intention to deceive, he speaks the truth which he did not think to be the truth.

May, or Can, Lying Sometimes Be Useful?

What if someone says something untrue, which he thinks to be untrue, because he supposes he will not be believed? He does this in order to dissuade, by the false belief he creates, the one to whom he speaks — knowing that the man does not wish to believe him. Here he is lying with the aim of not deceiving, if a lie is the utterance of something other than what one knows or thinks. But if a lie exists only when something is said with the will to deceive, then this man does not lie. He utters something untrue, although he knows or thinks it untrue, in order that the man to whom he speaks, by not believing him, may not be deceived.

If, then, it is possible for someone to say something untrue in order to keep another from being deceived, then the contrary is also possible: someone speaks the truth in order to deceive. For he who speaks the truth because he sees that he is not being believed speaks the truth in order to deceive. He knows or suspects that what he says may be taken as untrue precisely because he is the one saying it. Therefore, if he speaks the truth in order that it may be regarded as untrue, he speaks the truth in order to deceive.

We must therefore ask which of the two lies more: the one who says something untrue in order not to deceive, or the one who speaks the truth in order to deceive? The one who, by speaking untruth, brought it about that the other followed the truth; or the one who, by speaking truth, brought it about that the other followed the untrue?

Or have both perhaps lied: the one because he wished to say something untrue, the other because he wished to deceive? Or has neither lied: the one because he had the will not to deceive, the other because he had the will to speak the truth?

The question now is not which of them sinned, but which of them lied. It seems readily clear that he who, by speaking the truth, drove a man into the hands of robbers, sinned. And that the other did not sin, or even did good, by preventing through a lie that a man should be plunged into ruin.

But these examples can be reversed. If, then, we wish to avoid every haste and every lie, we must, when it is necessary to speak, utter that which we know to be true and credible, and we must also have the intention of persuading the hearer of what we utter. If, however, because we have taken what is false to be true, or what is unknown to be known, or what is incredible to be credible, or when there is no need to say anything, we nevertheless try to convince another of nothing else than what we are uttering, then there is indeed the fault of haste, but no lie.

The Opinion That One Must Sometimes Lie

Let us now examine the kind of lie about which everyone is agreed: is it sometimes useful to say something untrue with the intention of deceiving? Those who hold this view bring forward examples to support their opinion. They recall that Sarah, after she had laughed, denied to the angels that she had laughed. That Jacob, when his father questioned him, answered that he was Esau, his eldest son. That the Egyptian midwives lied to prevent the killing of the newborn Hebrew children, and that God Himself approved and rewarded them. By citing many such examples — drawn from people whom one does not dare to censure — they wish to prove that a lie can sometimes be not only not blameworthy, but even praiseworthy.

To this they add, in order to persuade not only those who hold to the divine Books but all human beings and common sense, the following: “If someone flees to you who can be saved from death by your lie, will you not lie? If a sick man asks something which it is not good for him to know, and your silence might torture him still worse, will you dare to speak the truth to the man’s harm, or to be silent, rather than to help his health by an honorable and merciful lie?” By these and similar arguments they suppose themselves to have shown abundantly that we must, when someone’s welfare is at stake, sometimes lie.

The Opinion That One Must Never Lie

Against this, those who hold that one must never lie argue much more powerfully. They appeal first of all to divine authority, since in the Ten Commandments it is written: “You shall not bear false witness” (Ex 20:16, RSV-CE). This embraces every lie, for whoever makes a declaration bears witness from his own mind. And to him who claims that not every lie is a false witness, what shall he say to what is written: “a lying mouth destroys the soul” (Wis 1:11, RSV-CE)? And lest anyone think this is to be understood with exception of certain lies, one may read in another place: “Thou destroyest those who speak lies” (Ps 5:6, RSV-CE).

Therefore the Lord Himself said: “Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil” (Mt 5:37, RSV-CE). And the Apostle, when he commanded that the old man be put off — by which all sins are meant — added immediately: “Therefore, putting away falsehood, let every one speak the truth with his neighbor” (Eph 4:25, RSV-CE).

The Examples of Lies from the Old Testament Discussed

They say that they are not deterred by the examples of lies from the old Books; for everything that took place there can be taken figuratively, even though it really happened. And whatever is done or said figuratively is no lie.

For every utterance must be judged according to that which it intends to express. What is done or said figuratively expresses precisely that which it signifies for those for whom it is meant to be understood. Therefore we must believe that those men who are mentioned with authority in the prophetic times did and said prophetically all that is written about them.

As for the midwives, they hold that these women did not act out of a prophetic spirit, to disclose what was to come, but were approved and rewarded by God according to their station. He who is accustomed to lying in order to do harm has already made great progress when he lies in order to help. But the one is praiseworthy in itself; the other is preferred only by comparison with something worse. We congratulate a man on his health in one way, and on the improvement of a sick man in another. In this way they judge all lies in the old Books which are not censured: either they are approved as a sign of growing virtue and hope, or, by reason of their symbolic meaning, they are no lies at all.

No Examples of Lying in the New Testament

Therefore, from the books of the New Testament — apart from the figurative significations of the Lord — one finds no examples that incite the imitation of lying, when one looks to the life and morals of the saints. The dissimulation of Peter and Barnabas is not only mentioned but rebuked and corrected.

It is not, as some suppose, that the apostle Paul, out of the same dissimulation, circumcised Timothy, or himself observed certain Jewish rites. Rather, he acted out of the freedom of his conviction, by which he preached that circumcision did the Gentiles no good and did the Jews no harm. Therefore he judged that the Gentiles must not be compelled to Jewish customs, and that the Jews must not be frightened away from their ancestral traditions.

Paul thus acted from this freedom and respected the ancestral practices, while taking care and preaching only that no one should suppose that without these practices Christian salvation was impossible. Peter’s dissimulation, on the contrary, compelled the Gentiles to live as Jews, as though salvation lay in Judaism. This is shown by Paul’s words: “How can you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews?” (Gal 2:14, RSV-CE). The dissimulation of Peter is therefore not to be compared with the freedom of Paul. We must, then, love Peter for his readiness to be corrected, but we must not justify lying on the authority of Paul.

A Lie Is Injustice and Brings the Death of the Soul

Those who are against lying argue with still greater conviction that we must not heed the examples drawn from daily life. They first show that lying is injustice, with many proofs from Sacred Scripture, especially with the text: “Thou hatest all evildoers. Thou destroyest those who speak lies” (Ps 5:5–6, RSV-CE). Either the second verse, as Scripture often does, expounds the first, so that we understand that by the lie, as a particular form of injustice, the whole of injustice is meant. Or, if one sees a difference, the lie is even more grave, since “to destroy” is heavier than “to hate.”

Which of those who say so will be moved by examples such as: “What if a man flees to you who can be saved from death by your lie?” The death which men foolishly fear, while they have no fear of sinning, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teaches in the Gospel. He therefore commands us not to fear that death. But “a lying mouth destroys the soul” (Wis 1:11, RSV-CE).

How, then, can it be said in the most depraved way that the one must die spiritually so that the other may live bodily? Even love of neighbor has its limit in love of oneself: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Mt 22:39, RSV-CE). How can a man love his neighbor as himself if, in order to give him temporal life, he himself loses eternal life?

If he were to lose his own temporal life for the temporal life of another, that would already be no longer to love as himself, but more than himself, which exceeds the rule of sound doctrine. Much less, then, will he lose his eternal life by lying for the temporal life of another. A Christian will not hesitate to lay down his own temporal life for the eternal life of his neighbor, for the Lord Himself has given us the example by dying for us.

Since, then, by lying eternal life is lost, one must never lie for anyone’s temporal life. To those who are scandalized when a man refuses to kill his soul with a lie so that another may grow old in the flesh, we say: what if someone could be saved from death by our theft, or by our adultery? Are we then to steal or to commit adultery? Why should anyone corrupt his soul with a lie so that another may live in the body, when, were he to give up his own body for this purpose, he would by everyone’s judgment be condemned for a shameful deed?

Not Even for Bodily Chastity May One Lie

The chastity of the body, which seems a most honorable reason for justifying a lie — for instance, when a ravisher approaches who can be turned away by a lie — can be easily refuted. There is no chastity of the body unless it depends on the integrity of the soul. If that integrity is breached, chastity necessarily falls, even if the body seems unbroken.

The soul, therefore, must not corrupt itself with a lie for the sake of its body, knowing that the body remains unbroken so long as integrity does not depart from the soul itself. What the body suffers under violence and without preceding lust must be called rather a torment than a violation. Or, if every torment is a violation, then not every violation is shameful, but only that which is caused by lust or with which lust consents.

The more excellent the soul is than the body, the more criminally is it violated. Chastity, therefore, can be preserved only where no violation is possible except by one’s own will. For it is certain that if a ravisher attacks the body and can be turned away neither by counter-force nor by any plan or lie, we must acknowledge that chastity cannot be violated by another’s lust.

Since no one doubts that the soul is better than the body, the integrity of the soul, which can be preserved eternally, must be set above the integrity of the body. Who would say that the soul of a liar is unbroken?

One Must Not Lie in Order to Bring Others to Eternal Life

If anyone supposes that he must lie for another, in order that the other may live, or may not be wounded in the things he loves, so that by learning he may come to the eternal Truth, he does not understand that he is then forced, for the same reason, to accept every shameful deed. Moreover, the very authority of doctrine is undermined and wholly destroyed if we, by our lying, persuade those whom we are trying to lead to that doctrine that one must sometimes lie.

The salutary teaching consists partly of things to be believed, and partly of things to be understood. One cannot come to the things to be understood unless first the things to be believed are believed. How can one then believe a man who thinks that one must sometimes lie — out of fear that he may also be lying when he commands us to believe? How is one to know that he does not at this very moment have a reason for what he reckons to be a dutiful lie?

If this is allowed and approved, the whole discipline of faith is undermined. When faith is undermined, one does not come to understanding, for which faith nourishes the little ones. Thus the whole teaching of the truth is taken away, and gives place to the most unbridled untruth, if anywhere even a single opening is made for what is called a dutiful lie.

Either he who lies sets the temporal advantages — his own or another’s — above the truth, and what could be more wrong than that? Or, while wishing by means of a lie to make someone fit for the reception of the truth, he closes off the access to truth itself. For by wishing to suit the moment when he lies, he becomes untrustworthy when he speaks the truth. Therefore, either we must not believe the good, or we must believe that those who, in our judgment, must sometimes lie, do indeed lie, or we must believe that good men never lie. Of these three, the first is harmful, the second foolish; therefore it remains that good men never lie.

The Lie as a Means of Preventing Rape

After this question has been considered and treated from both sides, the conclusion is not yet easily accepted. We must still attentively listen to those who say that no act is so evil that it may not be done in order to avoid a worse one. To the deeds of a man belongs not only what he does, but also what he undergoes with consent.

If, then, the case were to arise in which a Christian chose to offer incense to idols rather than to consent to the rape with which a persecutor was threatening him should he refuse, those persons rightly ask why he should not also lie in order to avoid so great a disgrace. The very consent by which he would rather undergo rape than offer incense to idols, they call not a passive enduring but an act. In order not to perform that act, he chose to offer incense. How much the more easily, then, would he have chosen a lie, if by a lie he could have turned so dreadful a crime away from his sacred body?

Refutation of This Argument and Example

In this argument there are several matters which can rightly be examined. Must such a consent be reckoned an act? Or can one speak of consent where there is no approval? And is it approval if one says, “It is better to undergo this than to do that”? And did that man act rightly in offering incense rather than undergoing rape? And ought he, if the choice were given, to have lied rather than to have offered incense?

If such a consent must be reckoned an act, then those also who chose rather to be killed than to bear false witness are murderers — and, what is a still graver kind of murder, murderers of themselves. Why should one not, in this way, say that they killed themselves, since they chose that this should befall them so as not to do what they were being compelled to do?

Just as such a person would have no part in that great crime — because he chose that his father should be killed by others, an outrage by which his father’s soul would be carried off to punishment — rather than violate his own faith with a false witness, so that consent would not make him a partaker in a great disgrace. If he himself willed no evil, whatever others did because he did not, he remains innocent. For what else are such persecutors saying than: “Do evil, lest we do it”? Even if they would not do it because of us, we ought not to help them with our crime. But now, since they are doing it, even if they do not say so, why should they, along with us, be shameful and harmful, instead of being so alone?

The Sins of Another Are Not Our Fault

How can you say, “He is not doing it together with them,” if they would not do it were he to do that other thing? In that way we break open doors with burglars, for if we did not lock them, they would not break them. And we kill men along with robbers, if we happen to know they intend it, for if we were to anticipate them by killing them, they would not kill others.

Or, if a man confesses to us that he is going to commit parricide, do we share in his deed if we do not kill him before he does, when we cannot in any other way restrain or hinder him? For with equal force one might say: “You shared in his deed, for he would not have done it if you had done that other thing.”

I would wish that neither of the two evils should occur. But I could only prevent what lay in my power. The evil of another, which I could not stop by my command, I was not permitted to forestall by my own crime. He, then, who does not sin for the sake of another does not approve of the sinner. And he who wills neither of the two to take place is consenting to neither. He restrains himself from what concerns himself, even if he has the power to do it; what concerns the other, he condemns only with his will.

Should he, then, have undergone rape rather than offer incense? If you ask what he ought to have done, he ought to have done neither. If I were to say that he ought to have done one of the two, I should be approving one of the two, while disapproving both. But if the question is which he ought rather to have avoided, since he could not avoid both but only one of them, then I answer: his own sin rather than another’s. And a lighter sin of his own rather than a graver sin of another.

Must One Lie to Prevent Bodily Defilement?

The kernel of this whole question comes down to this: must we examine whether no sin of another, even one committed against you, is reckoned to you if you could avoid it by a lighter sin of your own and do not? Or is all bodily defilement an exception?

For no one says that a man becomes defiled if he is killed, cast into prison, kept in chains, scourged, tormented with other tortures and afflictions, or banished and made to suffer the heaviest losses, even to the most extreme nakedness, or stripped of his honor and made to bear immense insults by every kind of reproach. Whatever a man unjustly suffers, no one is so foolish as to say that he is thereby defiled.

But if he is drenched with filth, or if such a thing is poured or thrust into his mouth, or if he undergoes the lot of a woman, then almost everyone’s feeling recoils, and they call him violated and defiled. Must we conclude, then, that all sins of others — apart from those which defile the one against whom they are committed — must not be avoided by sins of one’s own, neither for oneself nor for any other, but rather endured with courage? And if they are not to be avoided by any sin of one’s own, then not by a lie either.

But those sins which are committed against a man in such a way as to defile him — these we must avoid by our own sins. And therefore those things ought not even to be called sins which are done in order to avoid that defilement. For whatever is done in such a way that, were it not done, it would justly be censured, is not a sin. From this it follows that it ought not to be called defilement either, when there is no possibility of avoiding it. For even then, the one who undergoes it has something good to do, namely, patiently to bear what he cannot avoid.

Lies That Harm Others Are Not Permitted in Order to Avoid Bodily Defilement

Or must some lies be excepted, so that it is better to undergo that defilement than to commit those lies? If so, then not everything done to avoid that defilement is exempt from sin, since there are lies which are worse to commit than that defilement is to undergo.

For if a man is sought for rape and can be hidden by a lie, who dares to say that one must not lie in such a case? But if he can be hidden by a lie which damages another’s reputation — by falsely accusing that other of the very defilement for which the first is sought — for example, by saying to the seeker, while naming a chaste man who is far from such shameful deeds, “Go to him; he will provide you with someone you can use with greater pleasure, for he knows and esteems such people” — then the seeker would be drawn away from the one he was seeking. I do not know whether another’s reputation may be damaged by a lie, in order that another’s body may not be violated by another’s lust.

And in general one must never lie for anyone with a lie that harms another, even if the harm is lighter than the harm the other would suffer if you did not lie. For one must not take another’s bread against his will, even if he is the stronger, in order to feed a weaker man. Nor may one strike an innocent man with sticks against his will to keep another from being killed. To be sure, if they are willing, it is permitted, for then they are not harmed, since they will it so.

A Lie in the Doctrine of Religion Is Never Permitted

But if the choice to offer incense to idols rather than to undergo the lot of a woman were laid before someone, and one were, in order to avoid that lot, to violate the reputation of Christ with a lie, one would be out of his senses to do so.

I say even more: one would be insane if, to avoid another’s lust and to prevent something happening to him which he would undergo without his own lust, he were to falsify the Gospel of Christ with false praises of Christ. He would then be more concerned to avoid the violation of his body by another than the violation, by himself, of the doctrine of the sanctification of soul and body.

Therefore all lies must be wholly removed from the doctrine of religion, and from all utterances made on behalf of the doctrine of religion, when it is taught and learned. One must not believe that any reason can ever be found why one should lie in such matters. For one may not lie even in that doctrine in order to bring someone more easily to that doctrine. For if the authority of the truth is even slightly impaired or diminished, everything will remain doubtful. And if those things are not believed as true, they cannot be held with certainty.

Lies That Harm Others, or the Liar Himself, Must Also Be Avoided

This having been established as the first and most fixed principle, one can more safely consider other lies. Next, we must also see that all lies which unjustly harm someone must be avoided. For no one — not even with the lightest harm — may be unjustly wronged in order to ward off a heavier wrong from another.

Likewise, lies which harm no one but bring no one any good and harm those who tell them of their own free will, are not permitted. Those who do this ought rightly to be called liars. There is a difference between someone who lies and a liar. Someone who lies can do so even against his will. A liar, on the contrary, loves lying, and finds his pleasure in the very act of lying.

Beside these stand those who, by a lie, wish to please others — not in order to do anyone wrong or to insult them (that sort we have already excluded) — but in order to be agreeable in their conversations. They differ from the group we have called liars in this: that the former take pleasure in the lie itself, enjoying the deception. The latter wish to please by their smooth talk, and would rather please by the truth, but if they cannot easily find true things that are agreeable to their hearers, they choose to lie rather than to be silent.

Is a Lie That Harms No One and Helps Someone Permissible?

After these kinds of lies have been condemned without any doubt, there follows another kind of lie, if we ascend gradually to the better forms. This is the kind that is usually attributed to well-disposed and good people, when the one who lies not only does not harm another but even helps him. Concerning this kind of lie there is the whole controversy: does one harm oneself when, in this way, one helps another, by acting against the truth?

The question is whether one does not harm oneself by helping another in this way, or whether one does not harm oneself by the consideration that one is helping another. If that is so, then one ought also to be able to help oneself by a lie that harms no one. But these matters are linked together, and if one allows them, consequences are necessarily drawn after them which produce great confusion.

If one asks what harm it does to a man who is exceedingly rich to lose, out of his innumerable thousands of bushels of grain, a single peck — when that single peck might be of vital importance for the man who steals it — the consequence would be that theft can be committed without reproach, and false witness given without sin. What could be more perversely said than that?

Or Are There Honorable Lies That Help Some and Harm No One?

But perhaps someone thinks that an exception must be made, so that there are certain honorable lies which not only harm no one but even help some — with the exception of those lies by which crimes are concealed and defended. The lie which, although it harms no one and helps a poor man, nevertheless conceals a theft, would therefore be shameful. But if it harmed no one and helped someone, without concealing or defending any sin, then it would not be shameful.

For example, if someone in your presence hides his money to keep it from being taken by theft or violence, and you, when questioned about it, lie; you would harm no one, you would help the one who needed it to remain hidden, and you would not, by your lie, conceal any sin. For no one sins by hiding his own property, which he fears to lose.

But if we do not sin by lying because we conceal no one’s sin, harm no one, and help someone, what then are we to do with the sin of lying itself? For where it is written, “You shall not steal,” it is also written, “You shall not bear false witness.” Since both are forbidden separately, why is false witness blameworthy only when it conceals theft or some other sin, but not blameworthy when it stands by itself without defending a sin — when, on the contrary, theft and other sins are blameworthy in themselves? May one, then, conceal a sin with a lie, but commit the lie itself?

Is Lying Always to Bear False Witness?

If that is absurd, what then must we say? Is false witness only false witness when someone lies in such a way as either to fabricate a crime against another, or to conceal another’s crime, or in any way to harm another in a lawsuit? A witness, after all, seems necessary in order that the judge may know the case. But if Scripture used the term “witness” only in that sense, the Apostle would not say: “We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified of God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise” (1 Cor 15:15, RSV-CE). Thus he shows that a lie is a false witness, even when it is uttered in the form of false praise of someone.

False Witness and the Lie

Or is one who lies a false witness when he either fabricates or conceals someone’s sin, or in any way harms someone? If a lie directed against someone’s temporal life is reprehensible, how much more a lie directed against eternal life? Such is every lie when uttered in the doctrine of religion. For this reason the Apostle calls it false witness if anyone lies about Christ, even though it appears to be aimed at His praise.

But if a lie neither fabricates nor conceals anyone’s sin, is not asked about by a judge, harms no one and helps someone — is it not a false witness, and not a blameworthy lie?

Must One Lie in Order Not to Betray a Murderer, or an Innocent Man Sought for Death?

What, then, if a murderer takes refuge with a Christian, or if a Christian sees where he takes refuge, and he is questioned about it by the man who is seeking him to punish him for the murder? Must one then lie? How can one not, by a lie, conceal a sin, when the man for whom one lies has committed a horrible crime?

Or is it because his sin is not being asked about, but the place where he is hiding? So, lying to conceal someone’s sin is evil, but lying to conceal a sinner is not evil? It is so, someone says: for one does not sin in escaping punishment, but in doing what deserves punishment. And it belongs to Christian discipline neither to despair of anyone’s amendment, nor to bar anyone the way to repentance.

What, then, if you are brought before a judge and questioned about the place where he is hiding? Will you say, “He is not there, where you know him to be,” or, “I do not know and have not seen,” what you do know and have seen? Will you bear false witness and slay your soul, in order that the murderer may not be slain?

Will you lie until you stand before the judge, and then, when the judge questions you, speak the truth, so as not to be a false witness? Then you yourself will kill the man by betrayal. For Sacred Scripture also abhors the betrayer. Or is he perhaps no betrayer who reveals the truth to a judge questioning him, but he would be a betrayer if he were to deliver up someone to death of his own accord? How much stronger and more excellent it would be to say: “I will neither betray nor lie”?

Bishop Firmus of Thagaste

This was once done by a bishop of the church of Thagaste, named Firmus, who was even more steadfast in his will. When he was asked, by order of the emperor through his envoys, about a man who had taken refuge with him and whom he was hiding with every possible care, he answered the seekers that he could neither lie nor betray the man. And after suffering many bodily tortures (the emperors of that day were not yet Christians), he held to his stand.

He was then brought before the emperor, and bore himself so admirably that, without any difficulty, he obtained pardon for the man whom he was protecting. What can be done more strongly and more steadfastly than this?

But a more fearful man says: “I can be ready to endure all tortures, or even to undergo death itself, in order not to sin. But if it is not a sin to lie in such a way that one harms no one, bears no false witness, and helps someone, then it is foolish, and a grave sin, to undergo tortures voluntarily and in vain, and perhaps to surrender one’s useful health and life uselessly to the cruel.”

I ask him why he fears what is written, “You shall not bear false witness,” and does not fear what is said about God, “Thou destroyest those who speak lies” (Ps 5:6, RSV-CE)? “It is not written,” he says, “‘every lie’; rather I understand it as if it read: ‘Thou destroyest all those who bear false witness.’” But neither does the other text say, “every false witness.”

The Eight Kinds of Lies

The first kind of lie, which takes place in the doctrine of religion, is most especially to be avoided and held far from us. No one may be brought to this kind of lie under any condition whatsoever.

The second kind is that which unjustly harms another. This is a lie which helps no one and harms someone.

The third kind is that which helps the one but harms the other, even though it does not harm to the point of bodily defilement.

The fourth kind is that which springs purely from the lust to lie and to deceive — what is a pure lie.

The fifth kind is that which springs from the desire to please by smooth talk.

After all these kinds have been wholly avoided and rejected, there follows the sixth kind, which harms no one and helps someone. For example, if someone, knowing where another’s money — unlawful to be stolen — is kept, lies to whoever asks him, saying he does not know.

The seventh kind is that which harms no one and helps someone, except when a judge asks. For example, if someone, unwilling to betray a man sought for death, lies — not only about a just and innocent man, but also about a guilty one, since it belongs to Christian discipline neither to despair of anyone’s amendment, nor to bar anyone from the way of repentance.

The eighth kind of lie is that which harms no one and helps someone to avoid bodily defilement, especially the defilement of which we have spoken above.

The Question Whether One Must Lie When an Unavoidable Choice Is Set Before Us

Let us now bring to its end what we have set ourselves: must we lie when an unavoidable choice is laid before us — namely, that we either do this, or undergo rape or some other dreadful pollution — even when, by lying, we do no one any wrong?

How the Divine Authorities That Forbid Lying Must Be Interpreted

There will be room to consider this matter only if we first carefully examine the divine authorities that forbid lying. If they themselves leave no room, we look in vain for a way out. We must observe the commandment of God in every respect, and follow with even mind the will of God in the things which we undergo because of obedience to His commandment. But if any way out is offered, the lie ought not, in such a case, to be refused.

For this reason Sacred Scripture contains not only the commandments of God, but also the life and morals of the righteous, so that, if it should perhaps be unclear how a commandment is to be understood, it can be understood from the deeds of the righteous.

Excepting, then, those facts which can be referred to an allegorical meaning — although no one doubts that they happened — as is the case with almost everything in the books of the Old Testament. For who would dare to claim there that anything does not belong to a figurative foreshadowing? The Apostle himself asserts that the sons of Abraham signify two covenants. What facts can you find from which you might withdraw this rule, and dare to claim that they cannot be referred to some figurative meaning?

The Commandment to Turn the Other Cheek

For example, when we read in the Gospel: “If any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Mt 5:39, RSV-CE). We find no stronger and more excellent example of patience than that of the Lord Himself. Yet when He was struck, He did not say, “Here is the other cheek,” but: “If I have spoken wrongly, bear witness to the wrong; but if I have spoken rightly, why do you strike me?” (Jn 18:23, RSV-CE). Here He shows that the turning of the other cheek must take place in the heart.

The apostle Paul also knew this. For when he was struck before the high priest, he did not say, “Strike the other cheek,” but: “God shall strike you, you whitewashed wall! Are you sitting to judge me according to the law, and yet contrary to the law you order me to be struck?” (Acts 23:3, RSV-CE).

The Commandment Not to Swear at All

It is also written: “But I say to you, Do not swear at all” (Mt 5:34, RSV-CE). The Apostle himself, however, swore in his letters. And thus he showed how the saying, “I say to you, swear not at all,” was to be understood: namely, that one does not, by swearing, fall into a habit of swearing, and thence, from habit, into perjury. Therefore he is not found to have sworn except in writing, where a more careful consideration does not let the tongue be hasty.

The Double Mouth: of the Voice and of the Heart

Thus it is asked of which mouth is being spoken in the text: “a lying mouth destroys the soul” (Wis 1:11, RSV-CE). When Scripture speaks of the mouth, it often signifies the inner space of the heart, where there is decided and settled what shall be uttered with the voice — even when we are speaking the truth. Thus a man can lie with his heart, if the lie pleases him. But he can also fail to lie with his heart, if he expresses with his voice something other than what is in his mind, because he knows that he is permitting an evil in order to avoid a greater evil — although both are repugnant to him.

The Conclusion of What Has Gone Before

It becomes clear, therefore, from all these discussions, that the testimonies of the Scriptures teach nothing other than that one must never, never lie. There are no examples of lies to be found in the morals and deeds of the saints worthy of imitation, so far as concerns the Scriptures that do not refer to a figurative meaning, such as the events in the Acts of the Apostles.

All the sayings of the Lord in the Gospel which seem to the inexperienced to be lies are figurative meanings. And what the Apostle says, “I have become all things to all men, that I might by all means save some” (1 Cor 9:22, RSV-CE), must be rightly understood: not that he did this by lying, but by sympathizing.

Therefore, one must not lie in the doctrine of piety: that is a great crime, and the first kind of reprehensible lie.

One must not lie in the second way, for no one may be wronged.

One must not lie in the third way, for no one may be helped at the cost of another’s wrong.

One must not lie in the fourth way, out of the lust to lie, which is in itself wrong.

One must not lie in the fifth way, for not even the truth may be proclaimed for the purpose of pleasing men; how much less, then, a lie, which in itself, by reason of being a lie, is shameful.

One must not lie in the sixth way, for not even the truth of a testimony may be twisted for anyone’s temporal advantage or welfare.

One must not lie in the seventh way, for one’s ease or temporal welfare may not be set above fidelity.

One must not lie in the eighth way, for even among good things the chastity of the soul stands above the chastity of the body.

In these eight kinds, one sins the less in lying as one approaches the eighth, and the more as one descends toward the first. Whoever, however, supposes that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin shamefully deceives himself, while he reckons himself an honorable deceiver of others.

How Blind the Defenders of the Lie Are

So great a blindness has seized the minds of men that it is not enough for them when we say that some lies are not sins, unless we also say that in some cases it is a sin if we refuse to lie. And they have gone so far in their defense of the lie that they even claim that the apostle Paul made use of the first and most criminal kind.

In the Letter to the Galatians, which surely, like the others, was written for the doctrine of religion and piety, they say that he lied in the place where he says of Peter and Barnabas: “When I saw that they were not straightforward about the truth of the gospel” (Gal 2:14, RSV-CE). For while they wish to defend Peter against his fault and the wrong path on which he had set out, they try to overthrow the very way of religion itself — in which lies the salvation of all — by breaking and destroying the authority of the Scriptures.

In this they do not see that they accuse the Apostle not only of lying, but also of perjury in the very doctrine of piety — that is, in the letter in which he preaches the Gospel. For there, before he tells of this, he says: “In what I am writing to you, before God, I do not lie!” (Gal 1:20, RSV-CE).

But let this be the end of this discussion. In considering and treating all these things, we must above all think of nothing else and pray for nothing else than what the same Apostle says: “God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it” (1 Cor 10:13, RSV-CE).